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Abstract. We put forward a new family of computational assumptions, the Kernel Matrix Diffie-
Hellman Assumption. Given some matrix A sampled from some distribution D`,k, the kernel as-
sumption says that it is hard to find “in the exponent” a nonzero vector in the kernel of A>. This
family is the natural computational analogue of the Matrix Decisional Diffie-Hellman Assumption
(MDDH), proposed by Escala et al. As such it allows to extend the advantages of their algebraic
framework to computational assumptions.
The k-Decisional Linear Assumption is an example of a family of decisional assumptions of strictly
increasing hardness when k grows. We show that for any such family the corresponding Kernel
Assumption family is also a strictly increasingly weaker family of computational assumptions. This
requires ruling out the existence of some black-box reductions between flexible problems (i.e., com-
putational problems with a non unique solution).
1 Introduction
It is always desirable to base security of cryptographic protocols on the weakest possible assumptions,
like discrete logarithm or factoring. Although this is possible in many scenarios, it usually limits either
the efficiency or the functionality of the protocols. This is the main reason why stronger assumptions
like DDH are broadly used. However, such a strong assumption is not always true, like in the case of
symmetric bilinear groups. Therefore, it is important to have a thorough understanding of the hardness
of computational assumptions and their relations.
This issue has been treated extensively in the cryptographic literature, e.g., in [4,19,26,27,28,30,31]
just to name a few. On the computational side, many of the proposed assumptions are often shown
to be equivalent [4,19,30]. Typically, most computational problems related to prime order groups are
equivalent or reducible to CDH. However, on the stronger side, it is difficult to find relations between
decisional assumptions [4,10,11,30] which makes it hard to compare the security achieved by different
cryptographic protocols based on different assumptions.
The security notions for cryptographic protocols can be classified mainly in hiding and unforgeability
ones. The former typically appear in encryption schemes and commitments and the latter in signature
schemes and soundness in zero knowledge proofs. Although it is theoretically possible to base the hiding
property on computational problems, most of the practical schemes achieve this notion either information
theoretically or based on decisional assumptions, at least in the standard model. Likewise, unforgeability
naturally comes from computational assumptions (typically implied by stronger, decisional assumptions).
Most computational problems considered in the literature are search problems with a unique solution
like discrete logarithm or CDH. But, unforgeability actually means the inability to produce one among
many solutions to a given problem (e.g., in many signature schemes or zero knowledge proofs). Thus,
unforgeability is more naturally captured by a flexible computational problem, namely, a problem which
admits several solutions3. Unfortunately, flexible problems have received less attention until recently
[2,5,9,16,17,23,25]. This is probably due to the difficulty of finding reductions among them, and even
worse, of fully grasping the meaning of a black-box reduction between them. A better understanding
? This work has been partially supported by the Spanish research project MTM2013-41426-R.
3 In the cryptographic literature we sometimes find the term “strong” as an alternative to “flexible”, like the
Strong RSA or the Strong DDH
of flexible problems, which are weaker than non-flexible computational ones and harder than decisional
ones, would be a useful tool to design simpler or more efficient signature and zero knowledge protocols
with extended functionalities (in fact our framework has already been used in [22] and [21]), similarly to
what happened with decisional problems and encryption schemes with the work of Escala et al. [12].
The contribution of [12] is to put forward a new family of decisional assumptions in a prime order
group G, the Matrix Diffie-Hellman Assumption (D`,k-MDDH). It says that, given some matrix A ∈
Z`×kq sampled from some distribution D`,k, it is hard to decide membership in Im A in “the exponent”.
Rather than as new assumption, it should be seen as an algebraic framework for decisional assumptions
which includes as a special case the widely used k-Lin family. In line with the objective of improving
on the understanding of cryptographic assumptions, a natural question is if one can find an interesting
computational analogue of their MDDH Assumption.
1.1 Our results
In the following G = (G, q,P), beingG some group of order q generated by P where the discrete logarithm
is hard, and its elements are denoted [a] := aP.
Computational Matrix Assumptions. In our first attempt to design a computational analogue of
the MDDH Assumption, we introduce the Matrix Computational DH Assumption, (MCDH) which says
that, given a uniform vector [v] ∈ Gk and some matrix [A], A← D`,k for ` > k, it is hard to extend [v]
to a vector in G` in Im[A]. Although this assumption is natural and is weaker than the MDDH one, we
argue that it is equivalent to CDH.
We then propose the Kernel Matrix DH Assumption (D`,k-KerMDH). This new flexible assumption
states that, given some matrix [A], A← D`,k for some ` > k, it is hard to find a vector [v] ∈ G` in the
kernel of A>. We observe that for some special instances of D`,k, these assumptions have appeared in
the literature in [2,9,16,17,23,25] under different names, like Simultaneous Pairing, Simultaneous Double
Pairing (SDP in the following), Simultaneous Triple Pairing, 1-Flexible CDH, 1-Flexible Square CDH.
Thus, the new KerMDH Assumption allows us to organize and give a unified view on several useful
assumptions. This suggests that the KerMDH Assumption (and not the MCDH one) is the right compu-
tational analogue of the MDDH framework. We define a generalization of the KerMDH Assumption in
multilinear maps where the solution must be in one of the intermediate groups.
The criterions for generic hardness in k-linear maps for D`,k-MDDH also apply to the corresponding
Kernel Assumption, because D`,k-MDDH ⇒ D`,k-KerMDH. On the other hand, we argue that the known
attacks against decisional MDDH Assumptions in the current candidate k-linear maps [14] do not seem
to apply to the KerMDH Assumptions. We leave as an open question to further study its security in the
present candidate instantiations of k-linear maps.
The power of Kernel Assumptions. At Eurocrypt 2015, the KerMDH Assumptions were applied to
design simpler QA-NIZK proofs of membership in linear spaces [22]. They have also been used to give
more efficient constructions of structure preserving signatures [21]. The power of a KerMDH Assumption
is that it allows to guarantee uniqueness. This has been useful, for instance, to compile some secret key
primitives to the public key setting, a line of work initiated in [7]. Indeed, Kiltz et al. [22] modify a
hash proof system (which is only designated verifier) to allow public verification (a QA-NIZK proof of
membership). In a hash proof system for membership in some linear subspace of Gn spanned by the
columns of some matrix [M], the public information is [M>K], for some secret matrix K, and given the
proof [pi] that [y] is in the subspace, verification tests if [pi]
?
= [y>K].
The core argument to compile this to a public key primitive is that given ([A], [KA]), A← D`,k and
any pair [y], [pi],
e([pi>], [A]) = e([y>], [KA])⇐⇒ e([pi> − y>K], [A]) = [0]2 D`,k-KerMDH=⇒ [pi] = [y>K]. (1)
That is, although potentially there are many possible proofs which satisfy the public verification equation
(left hand side of Equation (1)), the D`,k-KerMDH Assumption guarantees that only one of them is
efficiently computable, so verification gives the same guarantees as in the private key setting (right hand
side of Equation (1)). This property is also used in a very similar way in the context of structure preserving
signatures [21]. In Section 5 we use it to argue that, of all the possible openings of a commitment,
only one is efficiently computable, i.e. to prove computational soundness of a commitment scheme. This
property is true of any KerMDH Assumption, and in particular it explains the great number of applications
of the Simultaneous (Double) Pairing Assumption, most notably in the design of structure preserving
cryptographic primitives [1,2,3,24] (to name a few). We expect that these constructions can be generalized
to any KerMDH Assumption.
The advantages of the Kernel Abstraction. As it was also true for its decisional variant, the
generalization to any Kernel assumption is useful in several ways. First, schemes based on any (decisional
or computational) D`,k Matrix Diffie-Hellman Assumption tend to highlight the algebraic structure of the
construction. Further, many instantiations of the given scheme can be written in a compact way and this
abstraction points out to a tradeoff between security and efficiency. Indeed, on the one hand, the uniform
assumption is the weakest of all possible assumptions but has the worst representation size, while the
symmetric cascade (defined in [12]) has optimal representation size but is a stronger assumption. The
algebraic viewpoint however, is not new or unique to this paper. The specific gain of introducing the
D`,k-KerMDH Assumption is that one can properly refer to the assumption on which security is based —
rather than just saying “security is based on an assumption weaker than D`,k-MDDH” —. For instance,
the SDP Assumption (RL2-KerMDH) is weaker than the L2-MDDH (or 2-Lin) Assumption and, when
possible, it is more precise to say that security is based on the former than on the latter.
This lack of precision is always undesirable in a reduction argument, but in the present case it leads
to some additional problems. One minor issue is that works which (implicitly) base the security on the
SDP Assumption but claim to base it on the 2-Lin Assumption are typically making non-optimal choices
which affect the efficiency of the protocol. This is because there are other computational assumptions
which are also weaker than L2-MDDH but have better representation size (in particular, the Kernel 2-Lin
Assumption), and which would typically reduce the size of the public parameters and the number of
cryptographic operations.
Another problem is that it is not clear if there are increasingly weaker families of KerMDH Assump-
tions. That is, some decisional assumptions families parameterized by k like the k-Lin Assumption are
known to strictly increasingly weaker. The proof of increasing hardness is more or less immediate and
the term strictly follows from the fact that every two D`,k-MDDH and D˜`,k˜-MDDH problems with k˜ < k
are separated by an oracle computing a k-linear map. For the computational case, increasing hardness is
also not too difficult, but nothing is known about strictly increasing hardness (see Fig. 1). This means
that, as opposed to the decisional case, for protocols based on KerMDH Assumptions there is no-known
tradeoff between larger k (less efficiency) and security.
Therefore, the claim that security is based on the MDDH decisional assumptions when only compu-
tational ones are necessary might give the impression that a certain tradeoff is in place when this is not
known to be the case. For instance, Jutla and Roy [20] construct constant-size QA-NIZK arguments of
membership in linear spaces under what they call the “Switching Lemma”, which is proven under a cer-
tain Dk+1,k-MDDH Assumption. However, a close look at the proof reveals that in fact it is based on the
corresponding Dk+1,k-KerMDH Assumption4 This means in particular that it is unclear if the choice of
larger k gives any additional guarantees, and the claim that the security relies on decisional assumptions
might obscure this.
Main result: strictly increasing families of Kernel Assumptions. We first show that the families
of matrix distributions in [12], U`,k, Lk, SCk, Ck and RLk, as well as CIk,d, define families of kernel
4 To see this, note that in the proof of their “Switching Lemma” on which soundness is based, they use the output
of the adversary to decide if f
?∈ ImA, A ← RLk, by checking whether [f ] is orthogonal to the adversary’s
output (equation (1), proof of Lemma 1, [20], full version), and where RLk is the matrix distribution of
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Fig. 1. If (Dk-MDDH)k are (strictly) increasingly weaker assumptions, the corresponding Kernel assumptions are
not necessarily (strictly) increasingly weaker. That is, the (non-)implications in dots do not follow from the other
(non-)implications.
problems with increasing hardness. For this we show show a rather straightforward reduction from the
smaller to the larger problems in each family. Our main result (Theorem 1) is to prove that the hardness
of these problems is strictly increasing. For this, we prove that there is no black-box reduction from the
larger to the smaller problems in the multilinear generic group model. These two results together prove
all the implications in dots in Fig. 1.
The last step requires dealing with the notion of black-box reduction between flexible problems. A
black-box reduction must work for any possible behavior of the oracle, but, on the contrary to the normal
(unique answer) black-box reductions, here the oracle has to choose among the set of valid answers in
every call. Ruling out the existence of a reduction implies that for any reduction there is an oracle behavior
for which the reduction fails. This is specially subtle when dealing with multiple oracle calls. We think
that the proof technique we introduce to deal with these issues can be considered as a contribution in
itself and it can potentially be used in future work.
Theorem 1 justifies the intuition that there is a tradeoff between the size of the matrix — which typi-
cally results in less efficiency — and the hardness of the KerMDH Problems, and justifies the generalization
of several protocols to different choices of k given in of [20,22,21].
New Applications. The discussion of our results given so far should already highlight some of the
advantages of using the new Kernel family of assumptions and the power of these new assumptions,
which have already been used in [22,21]. To further illustrate the usefulness of the new framework, we
apply it to the study of trapdoor commitments. First, we revisit the Pedersen commitment [29] to vectors
of scalars and its generalization to vectors of group elements of Abe et al. [2] in bilinear maps. We
generalize the construction to commit vectors of elements at each level Gr, for any 0 ≤ r ≤ m under the
extension of KerMDH Assumptions to the ideal m-graded encodings setting. In particular, when m = 2
we recover in a single construction as a special case both the original Pedersen commitment and its
generalization to vectors of group elements.
The (generalized) Pedersen commitment maps vectors inGr to vectors inGr+1, is perfectly hiding and
computationally binding under some Kernel Assumption. In Sect. 5.2 we give a black-box construction
from any such “shrinking” commitment to a “group-to-group” commitment, i.e. commitments which map
vectors in Gr to vectors in the same group Gr. These commitments were defined in [3] because they are a
good match to Groth-Sahai proofs. In [3], two constructions were given, one in asymmetric and the other
in symmetric bilinear groups. Both are optimal in terms of commitment size and number of verification
equations. Rather surprisingly, we show that both constructions in [3], are special instances of our group-
to-group commitment when the underlying “shrinking” commitment is the Pedersen commitment for
some specific matrix distributions.
A new family of MDDH Assumptions of optimal representation size. We also propose a new
interesting family of Matrix distributions, the circulant matrix distribution, CIk,d, which defines new
MDDH and KerMDH assumptions. This family generalizes the Symmetric Cascade Distribution (SCk)
defined in [12] to matrices of size `× k, ` = k + d > k + 1. We prove that the CIk,d-MDDH Assumption
is generically hard in k-linear maps. We prove that it has optimal representation size d independent of k
among all matrix distributions of the same size. The case ` > k + 1 typically arises when one considers
commitments/encryption in which the message is a vector of group elements instead of a single group
element and the representation size typically affects the size of the public parameters.
Analyzing the hardness of a family of decisional problems (depending on a parameter k) can be
rather involved, specially when an efficient k-linear map is supposed to exist. This is why in [12], the
authors gave a practical criterion for generic hardness when ` = k + 1 in terms of irreducibility of some
polynomials involved in the description of the problem. This criterion was used then to prove the generic
hardness of several families of MDDH Problems. To analyze the generic hardness of the CIk,d-MDDH
Problem for any d, the techniques in [12] are not practical enough, and we needed some extensions of
these techniques for the case ` > k + 1, recently introduced in [18]. However, we could not avoid the
explicit computation of a large (but well-structured) Gro¨bner basis of an ideal associated to the matrix
distribution. The new assumption can be used to instantiate the commitment schemes of Section 5 with
shorter public parameters and improved efficiency.
2 Preliminaries
For λ ∈ N, we write 1λ for the string of λ ones. For a set S, s ← S denotes the process of sampling an
element s from S uniformly at random. For an algorithm A, we write z ← A(x, y, . . .) to indicate that A
is a (probabilistic) algorithm that outputs z on input (x, y, . . .). For any two computational problems P1
and P2 we recall that P1 ⇒ P2 denotes the fact that P1 reduces to P2, and then ‘P1 is hard’⇒ ‘P2 is hard’.
Thus, we will use ‘⇒’ both for computational problems and for the corresponding hardness assumptions.
Let Gen denote a cyclic group instance generator, that is a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT)
algorithm that on input 1λ returns a description G = (G, q,P) of a cyclic group G of order q for a λ-bit
prime q and a generator P of G.
2.1 Multilinear Maps
In the case of groups with a bilinear map, or more generally with a k-linear map for some k ≥ 2,
we consider a generator producing the tuple (ek,G1,Gk, q,P1,Pk), where G1,Gk are cyclic groups of
prime-order q, Pi is a generator of Gi and e is a non-degenerate efficiently computable k-linear map
ek : G
k
1 → Gk, such that ek(P1, . . . ,P1) = Pk.
Multilinear groups (i.e., groups with a k-linear map for k > 2) have been considered in a number
of works both for functionality and for security reasons. However, the only known constructions of mul-
tilinear maps actually offer a reacher functionality: the graded encodings, which allow the computation
of ‘intermediate’ results in the evaluation of the k-linear map. As we will use multilinearity for security
reasons, we prefer to consider the reacher possible structure in the security model, then giving more power
to a potential adversary.
For any fixed k ≥ 1, let MGenk be a PPT algorithm that on input 1λ returns a description of a
graded encoding MGk = (e,G1, . . . ,Gk, q,P1, . . . ,Pk), where G1, . . . ,Gk are cyclic groups of prime-
order q, Pi is a generator of Gi and e is a collection of non-degenerate efficiently computable bilinear
maps ei,j : Gi ×Gj → Gi+j , for i + j ≤ k, such that e(Pi,Pj) = Pi+j . For simplicity we will omit the
subindexes of e when they become clear from the context. Sometimes G0 is used to refer to Zq. For group
elements we use the following implicit notation: for all i = 1, . . . , k, [a]i := aPi. The notation extends in
a natural way to vectors and matrices and to linear algebra operations. We sometimes drop the index
when referring to elements in G1, i.e., [a] := [a]1 = aP1. In particular, it holds that e([a]i, [b]j) = [ab]i+j .
Additionally, for the asymmetric case, let AGen2 be a PPT algorithm that on input 1
λ returns a
description of an asymmetric bilinear group AG2 = (e,G,H,T, q,P,Q), where G,H,T are cyclic groups
of prime-order q, P is a generator of G, Q is a generator of H and e : G×H → T is a non-degenerate,
efficiently computable bilinear map. In this case we refer to group elements as: [a]G := aP, [a]H := aQ
and [a]T := e(P,Q)a.
2.2 A Generic Model For Groups With Graded Encodings
In this section we describe a (purely algebraic) generic model for the graded encodings in order to obtain
meaningful results about the hardness and separations of computational problems. The model is a natural
extension of Maurer’s generic group model [26,27] including the k-graded encodings, but in a completely
algebraic formulation that follows the ideas in [6,13,18].
As we will handle elements in different groups, we will use the convenient vector notation [x]i for the
group elements [x1]i1 , . . . , [xn]in . We will use a tilde for the variables containing non-group elements (i.e.,
elements not in any Gi, i = 1, . . . , k). In a first approach we consider Maurer’s model augmented with
the graded encodings, but still not phrased in a purely algebraic language. In this model, an algorithm
A does not deal with proper group elements in Gi, but only with labels (Y, i), and it has access to an
additional oracle internally performing the group operations. Namely, on start A receives (in addition
to some non-group elements x˜) the labels (X1, i1), . . . , (Xn, in), corresponding to the group elements in
the input given to A, [x]i, along with two additional labels (0, i), (1, i) for the neutral element and the
generator of each group Gi. We will assume that these additional elements are implicitly given to all
algorithms. Then A can adaptively make the following queries to an oracle implementing the k-graded
encodings:
– GroupOp((Y1, i), (Y2, i)): group operation in Gi for two previously issued labels in Gi resulting in a
new label (Y3, i) in Gi.
– GroupInv((Y1, i)): idem. for group inversion in Gi.
– GroupPair((Y1, i), (Y2, j)): bilinear map for two previously issued labels in Gi and Gj , i + j ≤ k,
resulting in a new label (Y3, i+ j) in Gi+j .
– GroupEqTest((Y1, i), (Y2, i)): test two previously issued labels in Gi for equality of the corresponding
group elements, resulting in a bit (1 indicates equality).
Every badly formed query (for instance, containing an unknown label) is answered with a special rejection
symbol ⊥. Following the usual step in generic group model proofs (see for instance [6,12,18]), we use
polynomials as labels to group elements. Namely, labels in Gi are polynomials of degree ≤ i in Zq[X],
where the algebraic variables X = (X1, . . . , Xn) are just formal representations of the group elements in
the input of A. Now in the oracle side, group operations are replaced by polynomial operations in the
labels. The group elements [y]j in the output of A are now replaced by labels (Y1, j1), . . . , (Ym, jm) given
at some time by the generic group oracle. Therefore, for any fixed random tape of A and any choice of x˜,
there exist polynomials Y1, . . . , Ym ∈ Zq[X] of degrees upper bounded by j1, . . . , jm5 respectively, with
coefficients known to A.
Notice that the algorithm itself can predict all answers given by the oracle except for some equality
test queries. Indeed, some equality test queries trivially outputs 1, due to the group structure itself (e.g.,
the labels of [0], [x][−x] and [x]q are all equivalent). Nontrivial test queries (i.e., equality test queries
resulting in equality for two labels that are not ‘structurally’ equal) depend on the a priori constraints in
the input group elements, that is the definition of the problem instance solved by A. All the information
A can obtain from the generic group oracle is via the nontrivial equality test queries.
We now introduce a “purely algebraic” version of the generic model by replacing the test oracle with
a trivial one, answering 1 if and only if it is queried with two identical labels (polynomials). With this
replacement the behavior of A can only differ negligibly from the original, assuming that the distribution
of x can be sampled by evaluating polynomial functions of constant degree at a random point.6As usually,
the proposed generic model reduces the analysis of the hardness of some problems to solving a merely
algebraic problem related to polynomials. In particular, consider a computational problem P which
instances are entirely described by some group elements in the base group G1 [x] ← P.InstGen(1λ) and
its solutions are also described by some group elements [y]j ∈ P.Sol([x]). P is hard in the purely algebraic
generic multilinear group model if and only if for all (randomized) polynomials Y1, . . . , Ym ∈ Zq[X] of
degrees upper bounded by j1, . . . , jm respectively,
Pr([y]j ∈ P.Sol([x]) : [x]← P.InstGen(1λ), y = Y (x)) ∈ negl(λ)
5 The upper bounds on the degrees come from the fact that all input group elements are in G1, and the only
way to build elements in Gi is by using the bilinear maps or the “fixed” elements (the neutral elements and
the generators).
6 As a standard argument used in proofs in the generic group model, the difference between the original model
and its purely algebraic reformulation amounts to a negligible probability, which is typically upper-bounded by
using Schwartz-Zippel Lemma and the union bound, as shown for instance in [6,13,18].
where Y = (Y1, . . . , Ym) and the probability is computed with respect the random coins of the instance
generator and the randomized polynomials.7
On the other hand, from the above discussion we can state the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Let A be an algorithm in the (purely algebraic) generic multilinear group model. Let ([x]i, x˜)
and ([y]j , y˜) respectively be the input and output of A. Then, for every choice of x˜ and any choice of the
random tape of A, there exist polynomials Y1, . . . , Ym ∈ Zq[X] of degree upper bounded by j1, . . . , jm such
that y = Y (x), for all possible x ∈ Znq , where Y = (Y1, . . . , Ym). Moreover, y˜ does not depend on x.
The previous model extends naturally to algorithms with oracle access (e.g., black-box reductions)
but only when the oracles fit well into the generic model. Let us consider the algorithm AO, with oracle
access to O. A completely arbitrary oracle (specified in the plain model) could have access to the internal
representation of the group elements, and then it could leak some information that is outside the generic
group model. Thus, we will impose the very limiting constraint that the oracles are also “algebraic”,
meaning that the oracle’s input/output behaviour respects the one-wayness of the graded encodings,
it only performs polynomial operations on the input labels, but the constraint on the degrees of the
polynomials is removed.
Definition 1. Let ([u]d, u˜) and ([v]e, v˜) respectively be a query to an oracle O and its corresponding
answer, where u˜ and v˜ contain the respective non-group elements. The oracle O is called algebraic if for
any choice of u˜ there exist polynomials V1, . . . , Vβ ∈ Zq[U ,R], R = (R1, . . . , Rτ ), of constant degree (in
the security parameter) such that
– for the specific choice of u˜, vk = Vk(u, r), k = 1, . . . , β, for all u ∈ Zαq and r ∈ Zτq , where r =
(r1, . . . , rτ ) are parameters internally defined by the oracle,
– Vk does not depend on any Ul such that ek < dl (in order to preserve the one-wayness of the graded
encodings),
– v˜ does not depend on u, r (thus, r can only have influence in the group elements in the answer),
– the sets of parameters r corresponding to different oracle calls can be independent or not, depending
on whether the oracle is stateless or stateful.
Although this notion looks very limiting (e.g., it excludes a Discrete Logarithm oracle, as it destroys the
one-wayness property of the graded encodings, but oracles solving CDH or the Bilinear Computational
Diffie-Hellman problem fit well in the definition), it is general enough for our purposes8. The parameters
r capture the behaviour of an oracle solving a problem with many solutions (called here a “flexible”
problem).
We will need the following generalization of the previous lemma. Observe that we loose the control of
the degree of the polynomials due to the interaction with the algebraic oracle.
Lemma 2. Let AO be an oracle algorithm in the (purely algebraic) generic multilinear group model,
making a bounded number of calls Q to an algebraic oracle O. Let [x]i, [y]j , x˜ and y˜ defined as in
the previous lemma. Then, for every choice of x˜ and the random tape, there exist polynomials of con-
stant degree Y1, . . . , Ym ∈ Zq[X,R1, . . . ,RQ], such that y = Y (x, r1, . . . , rQ), for all possible inputs,
where Y = (Y1, . . . , Ym), and r1, . . . , rQ are the parameters introduced in Definition 1 for the Q queries.
Moreover, y˜ does not depend on x or r1, . . . , rQ.
Proof. We proceed by induction in Q. The first step, Q = 0, follows immediately from Lemma 1, because
AO is just an algorithm (without oracle access). For Q ≥ 1, we split AO into two sections AO0 and A1,
separated exactly at the last query point (see Figure 2). Let ([z]γ , z˜) be the state information (group
and non-group elements) that AO0 passes to A1, ([u]α, u˜) be the Q-th query to O, and ([v]β, v˜) be its
corresponding answer. We assume that AO0 and A1 receive the same random tape, $, (perhaps introducing
some redundant computations in A1). Observe that the output of AO0 consists of ([z]γ , z˜) and ([u]α, u˜).
7 We can similarly deal with problems with non-group elements both in the instance description and the solution,
but this would require a more sophisticated formalization, in which both the polynomials and the non-group
elements in the solution could depend on the non-group elements in the instance, but in an efficient way.
8 This model can be easily extended in a number of ways, but it would unnecessarily obfuscate the exposition.
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Fig. 2. Splitting of the oracle algorithm in Lemma 2.
By the induction assumption, for any choice of x˜ and $, there exist some polynomials of con-
stant degree Z1, . . . , Zγ ∈ Zq[X,R1, . . . ,RQ−1] and U1, . . . , Uα ∈ Zq[X,R1, . . . ,RQ−1] such that z =
Z(x, r1, . . . , rQ−1), where Z = (Z1, . . . , Zγ), and u = U(x, r1, . . . , rQ−1), where U = (U1, . . . , Uα), for
all possible x ∈ Znq and r1, . . . , rQ−1 ∈ Zτq . Moreover, z˜ and u˜ only depend on x˜ and $.
Now, the algorithm A1 receives as input ([z]γ , z˜) and ([v]β, v˜). By Definition 1, [v]e also depend
polynomially on u and rQ. Namely, for every choice of u˜, there exist polynomials of constant degree
V1, . . . , Vβ ∈ Zq[U ,RQ] such that v = V (u, rQ), where V = (V1, . . . , Vβ), while v˜ only depends on u˜.
SinceA1 is just an algorithm without oracle access, by Lemma 1, for any choice of v˜, z˜ and $, there exist
polynomials of constant degree Y1, . . . , Ym ∈ Zq[V ,Z] such that y = Y (v, z), where Y = (Y1, . . . , Ym),
for all v ∈ Zβq and z ∈ Zγq , while y˜ only depends on v˜, z˜ and $.
By composition of all the previous polynomials, we show that y depend polynomially on x and
r1, . . . , rQ, where the polynomials depend only on $ and x˜. Indeed
y = Y (V (U(x, r1, . . . , rQ−1), rQ),Z(x, r1, . . . , rQ−1))
and all the polynomials involved depend only on x˜, z˜, u˜, v˜ and $, but all in turn only depend on x˜ and
$. In addition, for the same reason, y˜ only can depend on x˜ and $, which concludes the proof.
2.3 The Matrix Decisional Diffie-Hellman Assumption
We recall here the definition of the decisional assumptions introduced in [12], which are the starting point
of our flexible computational matrix problems.
Definition 2. [12], Let `, k ∈ N with ` > k. We call D`,k a matrix distribution if it outputs (in
polynomial time, with overwhelming probability) matrices in Z`×kq of full rank k. We denote Dk := Dk+1,k.
Definition 3 (D`,k-MDDH Assumption). [12] Let D`,k be a matrix distribution. The D`,k-Matrix
Diffie-Hellman (D`,k-MDDH) Problem is telling apart the two probability distributions (G, q,P, [A], [Aw])
and (G, q,P, [A], [z]), where A← D`,k,w ← Zkq , z ← Z`q.
We say that the D`,k-Matrix Diffie-Hellman (D`,k-MDDH) Assumption holds relative to Gen the cor-
responding problem is hard, that is, if for all PPT adversaries A,
AdvD`,k,Gen(A) = Pr[A(G, [A], [Aw]) = 1]− Pr[A(G, [A], [z]) = 1] ∈ negl(λ),
where the probability is taken over G = (G, q,P) ← Gen(1λ), A ← D`,k,w ← Zkq , z ← Z`q and the coin
tosses of adversary A.
In the case of symmetric k-linear groups, we similarly say that the D`,k-MDDH Assumption holds
relative to MGenk when
AdvD`,k,MGenk(A) = Pr[A(MGk, [A]1, [Aw]1) = 1]− Pr[A(MGk, [A]1, [z]1) = 1] ∈ negl(λ),
where the probability is taken overMGk = (e,G1, . . . ,Gk, q,P1, . . . ,Pk)← MGenk(1λ), A← D`,k,w ←
Zkq , z ← Z`q and the coin tosses of adversary A. The asymmetric case is dealt with in the same way. We
will say that the D`,k-MDDH Assumption holds relative to AGen2 in the left (resp. in the right) when A
is given as input the output AG2 = (e,G,H,T, q,P,Q) of AGen2 along with the matrix A and the vector
Aw or z, both encoded in G (resp. in H).
The following definition just aims to simplifying some of the statements in the paper.
Definition 4. A matrix distribution D`,k is hard if the corresponding D`,k-MDDH problem is hard in the
generic k-linear group model.
Some particular families of matrix distributions were presented in [12]. Namely,
SCk : A =
a 01 . . .. . . a
0 1
 Ck : A =
a1 01 . . .. . . ak
0 1
 Lk : A =
a1 0. . .0 ak
1 · · · 1
 ,
where a, ai ← Zp, and U`,k which is simply the uniform distribution in Z`×kp . The SCk-MDDH As-
sumption is the Symmetric Cascade Assumption, the Ck-MDDH Assumption is the Cascade Assumption,
which were proposed for the first time. U`,k-MDDH and Lk-MDDH were implicitly used in some previous
works. Actually, Lk-MDDH is the Decisional Linear Assumption in [8]. For instance, we can consider
the case k = 2, in which the L2-MDDH problem is given ([1], [a1], [a2]), tell apart the two distributions
([1], [a1], [a2], [w1a1], [w2a2], [w1 + w2]) and ([1], [a1], [a2], [z1], [z2], [z3]), where a1, a2, w1, w2, z1, z2, z3 are
random. This is exactly the 2-Lin Problem, since we can always set z1 = w1a1 and z2 = w2a2.
We also give examples of matrix distributions which did not appear in [12] but that are implicitly
used in 2 and 4. The Randomized Linear and the Square Polynomial distributions are respectively given
by the matrices
RLk : A =

a1 0
. . .
0 ak
b1 · · · bk
 P`,2 : A =

a1 a
2
1
a2 a
2
2
...
...
a` a
2
`

where ai ← Zq and bi ← Z×q . Jutla and Roy [20] referred to RLk-MDDH Assumption as the k-lifted
Assumption. From the results in Section 4.2 it is easy to see that RLk is a hard matrix distribution.9
3 The Matrix Diffie-Hellman Computational Problems
In this section we introduce two families of search problems naturally related to the Matrix Decisional
Diffie-Hellman problems. Given a matrix distribution, D`,k, the first family consists of the problems of
given a matrix [A], where A ← D`,k, and the first k components of a vector [z], complete it so that
z ∈ Im A. The second family consists of the problems of finding [x] such that x ∈ ker A> \ {0}. It is
noticeable that some computational problems in the literature are particular cases of this second family.
We next show that any solution of the new search problems is enough to solve the corresponding
decisional MDDH problem. Finally, we study the existence of reductions between the kernel problems
for the matrix distributions previously given: for different sizes within the same distribution, and also
between different distributions with the same size.
9 The hardness of the P`,2 matrix distribution is partially analyzed, under the name of Simultaneous Pairing
Assumption, by Groth and Lu [17].
Definition 5 (D`,k-MCDH). Given a matrix distribution D`,k in a group G, such that the upper k × k
submatrix of A ← D`,k has full rank with overwhelming probability, the computational matrix Diffie-
Hellman Problem is given ([A], [z0]), with A← D`,k, z0 ← Zkq , compute [z1] ∈ G`−k such that (z0‖z1) ∈
Im A.
The full-rank condition ensures the existence of solutions to the D`,k-MCDH problem instance, and
then we tolerate the existence of a negligible fraction of the problem instances that are unsolvable. Indeed,
all known interesting matrix distributions fulfil this requirement with overwhelming probability.
Notice that CDH and the computational k-Lin problems are particular examples of MCDH problems.
Namely, CDH is exactly L1-MCDH and the computational k-Lin problem is Lk-MCDH. Indeed, the L1-
MCDH problem is given [1], [a], [z1], compute [z2] such that (z1, z2) is collinear with (1, a), or equivalently,
z2 = z1a, which is solving the CDH problem.
All MCDH problems have a unique solution and they appear naturally in some scenarios using MDDH
problems. For instance, the one-wayness of the encryption scheme in [12] is equivalent to the corresponding
MCDH assumption. However, any MCDH problem amounts to computing some polynomial on the elements
of A and it is equivalent to CDH ([4,19]), although the tightness of the reduction depends on the degree
of the polynomial.
The second family is more interesting. It is a family of flexible problems. Flexible computational
problems are the natural way to model the adversarial capability in some scenarios like unforgeability,
and finding reductions between flexible problems is not an obvious task. This new problem family is
closely related to the various flavors of “simultaneous pairing” assumptions in the literature.
Definition 6 (D`,k-KerMDH). Given a matrix distribution D`,k in a group G, the Kernel Diffie-Hellman
Problem is given [A], with A← D`,k, find a nonzero vector [x] ∈ G` such that x is orthogonal to Im A,
that is, x ∈ ker A> \ {0}.
Note that one can efficiently test if a vector [x] is a solution to the problem KerMDH in a bilinear
group, by checking whether e([x>], [A]) = [0]2.
Definition 6 naturally extends to asymmetric bilinear groups. There, given [A]H , the problem is to find
[x]G such that x ∈ ker A>\{0}. A solution can be obviously verified by checking if e([x>]G, [A]H) = [0]T .
We can also consider an extension of this problem in which the goal is to solve the same problem but giving
the solution in a different groupGr, in some ideal graded encodingMGm, for some 0 ≤ r ≤ min(m, k−1).
The case r = 1 corresponds to the previous problem defined in a m-linear group.
Definition 7 ((r,m,D`,k)-KerMDH). Given a matrix distribution D`,k over a m-linear group MGm and
r an integer 0 ≤ r ≤ min(m, k − 1), the (r,m,D`,k)-KerMDH Problem is to find [x]r ∈ G`r such that
x ∈ ker A> \ {0}.
When the precise degree of multilinearity m is not an issue, we will write (r,D`,k)-KerMDH instead of
(r,m,D`,k)-KerMDH, for any m ≥ r. Again, we note that if m ≥ r + 1 one can efficiently test if a vector
[x]r solves the (r,m,D`,k)-KerMDH by checking whether e([x>]r, [A]) = [0]r+1. However, if m = r the
solution of the problem cannot be checked as it would require the use of a (m + 1)-linear map. Notice
that we do not consider the case r ≥ k because it makes the problem easy.
Lemma 3. The (r,m,D`,k)-KerMDH Problem for k ≤ r ≤ m is easy.
Proof. If ` = k + 1, a solution to the problem is the vector [(A1,−A2, . . . , (−1)kAk+1)]r where Ai is the
minor of A obtained by deleting the i-th row, computed by means of the m-linear map, as m ≥ r. In
the case ` > k + 1 the solution can be obtained with a similar trick applied to any full-rank (k + 1)× k
submatrix of A.
3.1 Decisional vs. Computational Matrix Problems
In this section we detail the relation between the new search problems given in definitions 5 and 6 and
the Matrix Decisional Diffie-Hellman Problems. Specifically, any solution to the computational problems
allows to tell apart the real and the random instances of the corresponding MDDH problem.
The first lemma states the obvious relation between MCDH and MDDH.
Lemma 4. In a k-linear group, D`,k-MDDH ⇒ D`,k-MCDH.
The kernel problem is also harder than the corresponding decisional problem, in multilinear groups.
Lemma 5. In a m-linear group with m ≥ 2, D`,k-MDDH ⇒ D`,k-KerMDH.
Proof. Given an instance of the D`,k-MDDH problem ([A], [z]), a solution to test membership in Im A
is simply checking whether e([x>], [z]) = [x>z]2
?
= [0]2, where [x] is the output of the D`,k-KerMDH
solver on input [A]. For a real instance of D`,k-MDDH (i.e, z ∈ Im A) the solver gives always the correct
answer. Furthermore, if the instance is random (i.e., z is a random vector) then x>z = 0 occurs only
with a negligible probability 1/q. Therefore, the reduction works fine with overwhelming probability.
Analogously, we have
Lemma 6. In a m-linear group, D`,k-MDDH ⇒ (r,m,D`,k)-KerMDH for any 0 ≤ r ≤ m− 1.
3.2 The Kernel DH Assumptions in the Multilinear Maps Candidates
We have shown that for any hard matrix distribution D`,k the D`,k-KerMDH problem is generically hard in
m-linear groups. However, in the only candidate multilinear groups which have resisted cryptanalysis [14],
every D`,k-MDDH Assumption is false (see [14], full version, Section 4.4). Indeed, every MDDH problem
amounts to deciding whether a matrix has full rank or not.
Roughly speaking, in an m-linear group MGm, given a matrix [A]r, A ← D`,k, 0 ≤ r ≤ m − 1 and
the zero-test element given in the multilinear group description (which allows to decide if two elements
in Gm encode the same element of Zq), one can compute a matrix A
′ of “weak discrete logarithms”, i.e.,
a noisy encoding at level 0 of the matrix A. The attack uses that A′ has full rank if and only if A has.
Observe that the rank of A′ can be efficiently computed using standard linear algebra at level 0, without
using multilinear maps (so independently of `, k).
However, this attack does not apply in a straightforward way to break the KerMDH Assumption. With
the matrix A′ one can easily compute a nonzero vector v′ ∈ ker A′>, which is a “noisy version” of a
vector in ker A>, but it is not in Gi for any i = 1, . . . ,m. Thus, this attack does not apply directly to
break the (r,m,D`,k)-KerMDH. We leave it as an open question to examine this issue further.
3.3 A Unifying View on Computational Matrix Problems
In this section we recall some computational problems in the cryptographic literature that we unify as
particular instances of KerMDH problems. These problems are listed below, as they appear in the cited
references. In the following, all parameters ai and bi are assumed to be randomly chosen in Zq.
1. Find-Rep [9]: Given ([a1], . . . , [a`]), find a nonzero tuple (x1, . . . , x`) such that x1a1 + . . .+ a`x` = 0.
2. Simultaneous Double Pairing (SDP) [2]: Given the two tuples, ([a1], [b1]) and ([a2], [b2]), find a nonzero
tuple ([x1], [x2], [x3]) such that x1b1 + x2a1 = 0, x1b2 + x3a2 = 0.
3. Simultaneous Triple Pairing [16]: Given the two tuples, ([a1], [a2], [a3]) and ([b1], [b2], [b3]), find a
nonzero tuple ([x1], [x2], [x3]) such that x1a1 + x2a2 + x3a3 = 0, x1b1 + x2b2 + x3b3 = 0.
4. Simultaneous Pairing [17]: Given ([a1], [a2], . . . , [a`]) and ([a
2
1], [a
2
2], . . . , [a
2
` ]), find a nonzero tuple
([x1], . . . , [x`]) such that
∑`
i=1 xiai = 0,
∑`
i=1 xia
2
i = 0.
5. 1-Flexible Diffie-Hellman (1-FlexDH) [25]: Given ([1], [a], [b]), find a triple ([r], [ra], [rab]) with r 6= 0.
6. 1-Flexible Square Diffie-Hellman (1-FlexSDH) [23]: Given ([1], [a]), find a triple ([r], [ra], [ra2]) with
r 6= 0.
7. `-Flexible Diffie-Hellman (`-FlexDH) [25]: Given ([1], [a], [b]), find a (2`+ 1)-tuple ([r1], . . . , [r`], [r1a],
[r1r2a], . . . , [(
∏`
i=1 ri)a], [(
∏`
i=1 ri)ab]) such that rj 6= 0 for all j = 1, . . . , `.
8. Double Pairing (DP) [16]: In an asymmetric group (G,H,T), given a pair of random elements
([a1]H , [a2]H) ∈ H2, find a nonzero tuple ([x1]G, [x2]G) such that [x1a1 + x2a2]T = [0]T .
Notice that Find-Rep is just (0,U`,1)-KerMDH, SDP is RL2-KerMDH, the Simultaneous Triple Pair-
ing problem is U2-KerMDH, the Simultaneous Pairing problem is P`,2-KerMDH. DP corresponds to U1-
KerMDH in an asymmetric bilinear setting. On the other hand, 1-FlexDH is C2-KerMDH, 1-FlexSDH
problem is SC2-KerMDH and `-FlexDH for ` > 1 is the only one which is not in the KerMDH problem
family. However, `-FlexDH ⇒ C`+1-KerMDH. Getting the last three results require a bit more work, as
we show in the next two lemmas.
Lemma 7. 1-FlexDH = C2-KerMDH and 1-FlexSDH = SC2-KerMDH.
Proof. The proof of the first statement is obvious from the fact that the solutions ([r], [ra], [rab]) of
the 1-FlexDH problem instance ([1], [a], [b]) correspond exactly to the nonzero vectors in ker A> for
A =
−a 01 −b
0 1
. The second statement is proven in a similar way.
Lemma 8. `-FlexDH ⇒ C`+1-KerMDH.
Proof. Given a `-FlexDH problem instance ([1], [a], [b]), pick random r2, . . . , r` ∈ Z∗q and compute the
matrix [A] where
A =

−a 0
1 −r2
. . .
. . .
1 −r`
1 −b
0 1

Then, run the C`+1-KerMDH solver on [A], obtaining the vector ([r1], [r1a], [r1r2a], . . . , [r1 · · · r`a], [r1 · · · r`
ab]) for some r1 ∈ Z∗q , which along with ([r2], . . . , [r`]) solves the `-FlexDH problem.
4 Reduction and Separation of Kernel Diffie-Hellman Problems
In this section we prove the following result
Theorem 1. U`,k, Lk, CIk,d, SCk, Ck and RLk define families of KerMDH problems with strictly in-
creasing hardness.
By ‘strictly increasing’ we mean that
1. there are known reductions of the smaller problems to the larger problems (in terms of k) within each
family,
2. there are no black-box reductions in the other way in the multilinear generic group model.
This result means that it does make sense relying on D`,k-KerMDH Assumption for k > 2. A similar
result is known for the corresponding D`,k-MDDH problems. Indeed, one can easily prove a separation
between large and small problems. Observe that any efficient m-linear map can efficiently solve any
D`,k-MDDH problem with k ≤ m − 1, and therefore every two D`,k-MDDH and D˜`,k˜-MDDH problems
with k˜ < k are separated by an oracle computing a k-linear map.
However, when dealing with the computational D`,k-KerMDH family, no such a trivial argument is
known to exist. Actually, an m-linear map does not seem to help to solve any D`,k-KerMDH problem
with k > 1. Furthermore, the m-linear map seems to be useless for any (reasonable) reduction between
KerMDH problems defined over the same group. Indeed, all group elements involved in the problem
instances and their solutions belong to the base group G, and the result of computing any m-linear map
is an element in Gm, where no efficient map from Gm back to G is supposed to exist.
4.1 Separation
In this section we firstly show the negative part of Theorem 1. Namely, we show that there is no black-box
reduction in the generic group model (described in Section 2.2) from D`,k-KerMDH to D˜`,k˜-KerMDH for
k > k˜, assuming that the two matrix distributions D`,k and D˜`,k˜ are hard (see Definition 4). Before
proving the main result we need some technical lemmas and also a new geometrical notion defined on a
family of subspaces of a vector space, named t-Elusiveness.
In the first lemma we show that the natural (black-box, algebraic) reductions between KerMDH
problems have a very special form. Observe that a black-box reduction to a flexible problem must work
for any adversary solving it. In particular, the reduction should work for any solution given by this
adversary, or for any probability distribution of the solutions given by it. Informally, the lemma states
that the output of a successful reduction can always be computed in essentially two ways:
– by just applying a (randomized) linear map to the answer given by the adversary in the last call.
Therefore, all possibly existing previous calls to the adversary are just used to prepare the last one.
– by just ignoring the last call to the adversary and using only the information gathered in the previous
ones.
Let RO be a black-box reduction of D`,k-KerMDH to D˜`,k˜-KerMDH, in the purely algebraic generic
multilinear group model, discussed in Section 2.2, for some matrix distributions D`,k and D˜`,k˜. Namely,
RO solves D`,k-KerMDH with a non-negligible probability by making Q ≥ 1 queries to an oracle O solving
D˜`,k˜-KerMDH with probability one. As we aim at ruling out the existence of some reductions, we just
consider the best possible case any black-box reduction must be able to handle. Now we consider the
same splitting used in the proof of Lemma 2, RO = (RO0 ,R1), where the splitting point is the last oracle
call, as shown in Figure 3. More formally, on the input of [A], for A ← D`,k, and after making Q − 1
oracle calls, RO0 stops by outputting the last query to O, that is a matrix [A˜], where A˜ ∈ D˜`,k˜, together
with some state information s for R1. Next, R1 resumes the execution from the state information s and
the answer [w] ∈ G˜` given by the oracle, to finally output a vector [v] ∈ G`. Without loss of generality,
we assume that both stages RO0 and R1 receive the same random tape, $ (and perhaps R1 will redo some
of the computations performed by RO0 ).
In order to find some algebraic objects associated to the reduction, we first apply Lemma 2 to RO0 .
Notice that O is clearly an algebraic oracle (in the sense of Definition 1), because D˜`,k˜ is described by
a polynomial map, and there exists a polynomial map that parameterizes the subspace ker A˜> given A˜.
Actually, one can use the k˜-minors of A˜, which are just polynomials of degree k˜, to obtain a basis of
ker A˜>. Then the oracle can use parameters r1, . . . , r˜`−k˜ to build an arbitrary linear combination of the
basis vectors. Lemma 2 implies that only the group elements in s can depend on A. Indeed, the non-group
elements in s can only depend on $.
Next, from Lemma 1 applied to R1, we know that its output [v] is determined by a polynomial of
degree at most one in the input group elements (i.e., A˜ and the group elements in s), and the coefficients
of this polynomial can only depend on $, and the non-group elements in s, which in turn only depend on
$. Therefore, for every fixed $, and every fixed oracle behaviour in the first Q−1 oracle calls, there exists
a vector u ∈ Z`q and a linear map η : Z˜`q → Z`q such that we can write v = u + η(w), where u actually
depends on the group elements in s. The important fact here is that η can only depend on $, but not on
A.
Lemma 9. Let RO = (RO0 ,R1) be a black-box reduction from D`,k-KerMDH to D˜`,k˜-KerMDH, in the
purely algebraic generic multilinear group model, making Q ≥ 1 calls to an oracle O solving the latter
with probability one. If RO succeeds with a non negligible probability then, for every possible behaviour of
the oracle, either Pr(η(w) ∈ S′) > negl or Pr(u ∈ S′) > negl , where S′ = ker A> \ {0}, [A] is the input
of RO, and its output is written as [u+η(w)], for some u only depending on the state output by RO0 , [w]
is the answer to the Q-th oracle query, and η : Zl˜q → Zlq is a (randomized) linear map that only depends
on the random tape of RO.
[A]
$
R0
O
Q− 1 queries
O
last query
R1 [v] = [u + η(w)]s
[A˜]
[w]
Fig. 3. Splitting of the black-box reduction.
Proof. Let us denote S = ker A>, where [A] is the input to RO, and S′ = S \ {0}. Analogously,
S˜ = ker A˜>, where [A˜] is the Q-th oracle query, and S˜′ = S˜ \ {0}. From the discussion preceding the
lemma, we know that u and η are well-defined and fulfil the required properties. In particular, η depends
only on the random tape, $, of RO.
As a black-box reduction, RO is successful means that it is successful for every possible behaviour of
the oracle in its Q queries. We arbitrarily fix its behaviour in the first Q− 1 queries. Concerning the last
one, for all w ∈ S˜′, Pr(u+ η(w) ∈ S′) > negl , where the probability is computed with respect to $ and
the randomness of [A]. Now, defining
pw = Pr(u ∈ S ∧ u+ η(w) ∈ S′)
rw = Pr(u /∈ S ∧ u+ η(w) ∈ S′)
we have pw+ rw > negl . But not all rw can be non-negligible since the corresponding events are disjoint.
Indeed, for every nonzero vector w and any different α1, α2 ∈ Z×q ,
u+ η(α1w) ∈ S, u+ η(α2w) ∈ S ⇒ (α2 − α1)u ∈ S ⇒ u ∈ S
and then
∑
α∈Z×q rαw ≤ 1. Therefore, there is some αm such that rαmw ≤ 1q−1 , which in turn implies
pαmw > negl . Now, we can split pαmw depending on whether u ∈ S′ or u = 0, obtaining
pαmw = Pr(u = 0 ∧ η(w) ∈ S′) + Pr(u ∈ S′ ∧ u+ η(αmw) ∈ S′) ≤
≤ Pr(η(w) ∈ S′) + Pr(u ∈ S′)
and concluding that either Pr(u ∈ S′) > negl or for all nonzero w ∈ S˜′, Pr(η(w) ∈ S′) > negl . However,
which one is true could depend on the particular behaviour of the oracle in the first Q− 1 calls.
In some cases, one of the two strategies of the reduction mentioned above can be ruled out. Namely,
we can prove that Pr(η(w) ∈ S \ {0}) ∈ negl .
Lemma 10. Consider integers l = k+d, l˜ = k˜+d˜ such that k, d, k˜, d˜ > 0 and k > k˜. Let η : Zl˜q → Zlq be a
linear map. Then, there exists a subspace F of Im η of dimension at most k such that for all d˜-dimensional
subspaces S˜ of Zl˜q, either S˜ ⊂ ker η or dimF ∩ η(S˜) ≥ 1.
Proof. If rank η ≤ k it suffices to take F = Im η. Indeed, if S˜ 6⊂ ker η, i.e., η(S˜) 6= {0}, then dimF∩η(S˜) =
dim η(S˜) ≥ 1.
Otherwise, rank η > k, let F a subspace of Im η of dimension k, using the Grassman’s formula,
dimF ∩ η(S˜) = dimF + dim η(S˜)− dim(F + η(S˜)) ≥
≥ k + dim η(S˜)− rank η ≥ k + dim S˜ − dim ker η − rank η =
= k + d˜− l˜ = k − k˜ ≥ 1
Definition 8 (t-Elusiveness). A family of subspaces S of a vector space X over the finite field Zq is
called t-elusive for some t < dimX if for all t-dimensional subspaces F ⊂ X, Pr(F ∩ S 6= {0}) ∈ negl ,
where the probability is computed with respect to the choice of S ∈ S.
A matrix distribution D`,k is called t-elusive if the family {ker A>}A∈D`,k is t-elusive.
Lemma 11. If a matrix distribution D`,k is hard (as given in Definition 4) then D`,k is k-elusive.
Proof. By definition, given a non-k-elusive matrix distribution D`,k, there exists a k-dimensional vector
subspace F ⊂ Z`q such that PrA←D`,k(F ∩ ker A> 6= {0}) > negl . F can be efficiently computed from the
description of D`,k with standard tools from linear algebra.
Let M ∈ Zk×`q be a maximal rank matrix such that Im M> = F . Then, dim(F ∩ ker A>) =
dim(Im M> ∩ ker A>) ≤ dim ker(A>M>) = dim ker(MA)> = dim ker(MA), as MA is a k × k square
matrix. Thus, we know that
Pr
A←D`,k
(rank(MA) < k) > negl
Now we show how to solve the D`,k-MDDH problem on some k-linear group G, by means of a k-linear
map. Let [(A‖z)] be an instance of the D`,k-MDDH problem. In a ‘real’ instance z = Ax for a uni-
formly distributed vector x ∈ Zkq , while in a ‘random’ instance, z is uniformly distributed Z`q. A dis-
tinguisher can efficiently compute [MA] and [Mz]. Observe that in a ‘real’ instance rank(MA‖Mz) =
rank(MA‖MAx) = rank(MA), while in a ‘random’ instance Mz is uniformly distributed in Zkq . There-
fore, for a ‘random’ instance there is a non-negligible probability that rank(MA) < k and rank(MA‖Mz)
= rank(MA) + 1, because Mz ∈ Im(MA) occurs only with a negligible probability < 1q . Then, the dis-
tinguisher can efficiently tell apart the two cases because with a k-linear map at hand computing the
rank of a k × k or a k × k + 1 matrix can be done efficiently.
Theorem 2. Let D`,k be k-elusive. If there exists a black-box reduction in the purely algebraic generic
multilinear group model from D`,k-KerMDH to another problem D˜`,k˜-KerMDH with k˜ < k, then D`,k-KerMDH
is easy.
Proof. Let us assume the existence of the claimed reduction, RO = (RO0 ,R1), making Q ≥ 1 oracle
queries, whereQ is minimal. Then, by Lemma 9, its output can be written as [u+η(w)], where η : Zl˜q → Zlq
is a (randomized) linear map that does not depend on the particular choice of the matrix A in the
D`,k-KerMDH input instance, but only on the random tape of the reduction. Let us denote as above
S = ker A>, and S′ = S \ {0}. Analogously, S˜ = ker A˜>, where A˜← D˜`,k˜ and S˜′ = S˜ \ {0}.
We now prove that in Lemma 9, for any possible behaviour of the oracle in the first Q− 1 calls, there
exists a particular behaviour in the last call such that Pr(η(w) ∈ S′) is negligible. Namely, the Q-th
query is answered by O by choosing a uniformly distributed w ∈ S˜′. Indeed,
Pr(η(w) ∈ S′) = Pr(η(w) ∈ S)− Pr(η(w) = 0)
Now, developing the second term,
Pr(η(w) = 0) = Pr(η(w) = 0 | S˜ ⊂ ker η) Pr(S˜ ⊂ ker η) +
+ Pr(η(w) = 0 | S˜ 6⊂ ker η) Pr(S˜ 6⊂ ker η) =
= Pr(S˜ ⊂ ker η) + Pr(w ∈ S˜ ∩ ker η | S˜ 6⊂ ker η) Pr(S˜ 6⊂ ker η) =
= Pr(S˜ ⊂ ker η) + negl
where the last equality uses that the probability that a vector uniformly distributed in S˜′ belongs to a
proper subspace of S˜′ is negligible. And, analogously for the first term,
Pr(η(w) ∈ S) = Pr(η(w) ∈ S | η(S˜) ⊂ S) Pr(η(S˜) ⊂ S) +
+ Pr(η(w) ∈ S | η(S˜) 6⊂ S) Pr(η(S˜) 6⊂ S) =
= Pr(η(S˜) ⊂ S) + Pr(w ∈ S˜ ∩ η−1(S) | η(S˜) 6⊂ S) Pr(η(S˜) 6⊂ S) =
= Pr(η(S˜) ⊂ S) + negl
Thus,
Pr(η(w) ∈ S′) = Pr(η(S˜) ⊂ S)− Pr(S˜ ⊂ ker η) + negl
Now, using Lemma 10, we know that there exists a subspace F of dimension at most k such that if
S˜ 6⊂ ker η, then dimF∩η(S˜) ≥ 1. Therefore Pr(η(S˜) ⊂ S)−Pr(S˜ ⊂ ker η) ≤ Pr(η(S˜) ⊂ S∧dimF∩η(S˜) ≥
1) ≤ Pr(dimF ∩ S ≥ 1). But the last probability is negligible due to the k-elusiveness of D`,k.
Now applying Lemma 9 we know that Pr(u ∈ S \ {0}) > negl for any possible behaviour of the oracle
in the first Q − 1 calls. Therefore, we can modify the reduction R to output u, without making the
Q-th oracle call. The modified reduction is also successful, with only Q− 1 oracle calls, which contradicts
the assumption that Q is minimal. In summary, if the claimed reduction exists then there also exists an
algorithm (a “reduction with Q = 0”) directly solving D`,k-KerMDH without the help of any oracle.
Corollary 1. If a matrix distribution family {D`,k} is hard then for any D`,k and D˜`,k˜ in the family with
k > k˜ there is no black-box reduction in the generic group model from D`,k-KerMDH to D˜`,k˜-KerMDH.
Proof. Since all D`,k-MDDH problems in the family are generically hard on a k-linear group, we know
that D`,k is k-elusive by Lemma 11, and also D`,k-KerMDH is hard in that group (otherwise, any solution
to D`,k-KerMDH can be used to solve D`,k-MDDH in a straightforward way). By the above theorem, no
black-box reduction in the generic group model from D`,k-KerMDH to D˜`,k˜-KerMDH can exist for k > k˜.
4.2 Algebraic Reductions
In contrast to the previous negative results we now show how to build some natural reductions among
different families of KerMDH problems of the same size. Thanks to the algebraic nature of matrix distri-
butions it is easy to find some generic reductions among the corresponding problems.
Definition 9. We say that D1`,k is algebraically reducible to D2`,k if there exist two efficiently samplable
matrix distributions, L which outputs a matrix L ∈ Z`×`q matrix and R which outputs a matrix R ∈ Zk×kq ,
such that given A← D1`,k the distribution of the matrix LAR is negligibly close to D2`,k. In this case we
write D1`,k a⇒ D2`,k.
We note that since we assume that the matrices output by either of the distributions D1`,k, D2`,k have
full rank with overwhelming probability, the distributions L,R must output full rank matrices also with
overwhelming probability. We provide two examples of algebraic reductions: Taking random L and R
gives the reduction D`,k a⇒ U`,k for any matrix distribution D`,k, and considering L the identity matrix
and R a random invertible diagonal matrix, we obtain Lk a⇒ RLk.
The notion of algebraic reducibility is useful to find reductions among the MDDH problems and also
the Kernel problems.
Lemma 12. D1`,k a⇒ D2`,k implies both D1`,k-MDDH ⇒ D2`,k-MDDH and D1`,k-KerMDH ⇒ D2`,k-KerMDH.
Proof. Given instance of the D1`,k-MDDH problem, ([A], [z]), the tuple ([LAR], [Lz]), with L ← L,
R← R is a properly distributed instance of the D2`,k-MDDH problem. Indeed, it is easy to see that ‘real’
instances are transformed into ‘real’ instances, and ‘random’ instances into ‘random’ ones.
On the other hand, we show that given an algorithm A which solves D2`,k-KerMDH there exists another
algorithm which solves D1`,k-KerMDH with the same probability. Given A ← D1`,k-KerMDH problem,
sample two matrices L← L, R← R and construct an instance LAR of D2`,k. Let [x] be the output of A
on input [LAR], that is, x is a nonzero vector such that x>LAR = 0>. Since L and R are invertible with
overwhelming probability, x>LA = 0> also holds. Then output the nonzero vector [L>x] as a solution
to the D1`,k-KerMDH problem.
From the above results, it is straightforward that D`,k-KerMDH ⇒ U`,k-KerMDH, for any matrix
distribution D`,k, and Lk-KerMDH ⇒ RLk-KerMDH.
4.3 Increasing Families of KerMDH Problems
Most matrix distributions, like U`,k, Lk, CIk,d, SCk, Ck and RLk, are indeed families parameterized by
their size k. The negative results in Corollary 1 prevent us to find reductions from larger to smaller
KerMDH problems. Nevertheless, we provide here some examples of reductions going in the other way,
within each of the previous families.
There is no known generic way to do that, and we use different techniques to build the reductions
for each separate family. Observe that we cannot use the previously defined algebraic reductions here,
because the reductions we need must increase the rank of the matrices, and this can be never done by
matrix multiplications.
Lemma 13. U˜`,k˜-KerMDH⇒ U`,k-KerMDH for k˜ ≤ k and ˜`≤ `.
Proof. Given an instance [A˜], with A˜ ← U˜`,k˜, we choose random invertible matrices L ∈ Z`×`q and
R ∈ Zk×kq and compute [A] = L([A˜] ⊕ [B])R, where B is any full-rank matrix in Z(`−
˜`)×(k−k˜)
q and ⊕
operation denotes diagonal block matrix concatenation. Clearly, the probability distribution of the new
matrix is statistically close to the uniform distribution in Z`×kq .
Any vector [x], obtained from a solver of U`,k-KerMDH, such that x ∈ ker A>\{0} can be transformed
into [x˜] such that x˜ ∈ ker A˜> \ {0} with overwhelming probability, by just letting [x˜] to be the first ˜`
components of L>[x]. Thus, we have built a tight reduction.
Lemma 14. Lk-KerMDH⇒ Lk+1-KerMDH.
Proof. Observe that given a matrix A˜ ← Lk, with parameters a1, . . . , ak, we can build a matrix A fol-
lowing the distribution Lk+1, by adding an extra row and column to A˜ corresponding to new random pa-
rameter ak+1 ∈ Zq. Moreover, given x = (x1, . . . , xk+2) ∈ ker A> \ {0}, the vector x˜ = (x1, . . . , xk, xk+2)
is in ker A˜> \ {0} (except for a negligible probability due to the possibility that ak+1 = 0 and x˜ = 0,
while x 6= 0). The reduction consists of choosing a random ak+1, then building [A] from [A˜] as above,
and finally obtaining [x˜] from [x] by deleting the (k + 1)-th coordinate.
Lemma 15. SCk-KerMDH⇒ SCk+1-KerMDH.
Proof. Similarly, from a matrix A˜← SCk, with parameter a, we can obtain a matrix A following SCk+1
by adding a new row and column to A˜. Now given x = (x1, . . . , xk+2) ∈ ker A> \ {0}, it is easy to see
that the vector x˜ = (x1, . . . , xk+1) is always in ker A˜
> \ {0}.
The proofs of Ck-KerMDH ⇒ Ck+1-KerMDH and RLk-KerMDH ⇒ RLk+1-KerMDH directly follow
from the same ideas.
By combining the negative results in Corollary 1 with the explicit reductions given above, we conclude
the proof of Theorem 1.
5 Application to Trapdoor Commitments
As a concrete application, we study how to abstract two constructions of trapdoor commitments in the
literature to any Kernel Assumption. We recall the definition of a trapdoor commitment scheme.
Definition 10. A commitment scheme is a tuple of three algorithms (K,Comm,Vrfy) such that:
– K is a randomized algorithm, which on input the security parameter 1λ outputs a commitment key ck,
– Comm is a randomized algorithm which, on input the commitment key ck and a message m in the
message space Mck outputs a commitment c and an opening Op,
– Vrfy is a deterministic algorithm which, on input the commitment key ck, a message m in the message
space Mck and an opening Op, outputs 1 if Op is a valid opening of c to the message m and 0
otherwise.
Correctness requires that
Pr
[
1← Vrfy(ck, c,m,Op) : ck ← K(1λ),m←Mck, (c,Op)← Comm(ck,m)
]
= 1.
Definition 11. A commitment scheme is binding if, for any polynomial-time adversary A,
Pr
[
1← Vrfy(ck, c,m,Op) ∩ 1← Vrfy(ck, c,m′, Op′) : ck ← K(1λ), (c,m,Op,m′, Op′)← A(ck)]
is negligible. It is hiding if, for any polynomial-time adversary A,
|Pr [b′ = b : ck ← K(1λ), (m0,m1, st)← A(ck), b← {0, 1}, (c,Op)← Comm(ck,mb), b′ ← A(st, c)]− 1
2
|
is negligible.
Definition 12. A commitment scheme is trapdoor if K additionally outputs a trapdoor key tk and there
is an efficient algorithm TrapdoorEquiv which, on input (ck, tk, c,m,Op,m′) outputs Op′ such that 1 ←
Vrfy(ck, c,m′, Op′). Further, for any pair of valid messages m, m′ and legitimately generated ck, tk, it holds
that the distributions (ck, c, Op′) when (c,Op)← Comm(ck,m), Op′ ← TrapdoorEquiv(ck, tk, c,m,Op,m′)
or when (c,Op′)← Comm(ck,m′) are indistinguishable.
5.1 Generalized Pedersen Commments in Multilinear Groups
In a group (G, q,P) where the discrete logarithm is hard, the Pedersen commitment is a statistically
hiding and computationally binding commitment to a scalar. It can be naturally generalized to several
scalars. Abe et al. [2] show how to do similar Pedersen type commitments to group elements in bilinear
asymmetric groups under the DP Assumption, which in our language is the U1+d,1-KerMDH Assumption.
With our new assumption family we can write both the Pedersen commitment and the commitment of [2]
as a single construction and generalize it to (ideal) graded encodings.
– K(1λ, d,m): Let MGm = (e,G1,G2, . . . ,Gm, q,P1, . . . ,Pm) ← MGenm(1λ). Sample A ← Dk+d,k.
Let A be the first k rows of A and A the remaining d rows and T := AA
−1
(w.l.o.g. we can assume
A is invertible). Output ck := (MGm, [A]1), tk := (T).
– Comm(ck, [c], [v]r): To commit to a vector [v]r ∈ Gdr , r < m, pick s← Zkq , and output
[c]r+1 := e([
(
s> || v>)]r, [A]1) = [(s> || v>)A]r+1 ∈ Gkr+1,
and the opening Op = ([s]r).
– Vrfy(ck, [v]r, Op): This algorithm outputs 1 if
[c]r+1 = e([s
>]r, [A]1).
– TrapdoorEquiv(ck, tk, [c]r+1, [v]r, Op, [v
′]r): On a commitment [c]r+1 ∈ Gkr+1 to message [v]r with
opening Op = ([s]r), compute:
[s′]r := [s]r + T>[(v − v′)]r ∈ Gkr .
Output Op′ = ([s′]r) as the opening of [c]r+1 to [v′]r.
The analysis is almost identical to [2]. The correctness of the trapdoor opening is straightforward.
The hiding property of the commitment is unconditional, while the soundness (at level r) is based on
the (r,m,D`,k)-KerMDH Assumption. Indeed, given two messages [v]r, [v′]r with respective openings
[s]r, [s
′]r, it obviously follows that [w] := [
(
(s− s′)> || (v − v′)>)]r is a nonzero element in the kernel
(in Gr) of A
>, i.e. e([w>]r, [A]1) = [0k]r+1.
Existing constructions. The Pedersen commitment (to multiple elements) is for messages in G0 and
A ← Ud+1,1 and soundness is based on the (0,m,Ud+1,1)-KerMDH. The construction proposed in [2] is
for an asymmetric bilinear group AG2 = (e,G,H,T, q,P,Q), and in this case messages are vectors in the
group H and the commitment key consists of elements in G, i.e. ck = (AG2, [A]G), A← Ud+1,1. Further,
a previous version of the commitment scheme of [2] in symmetric bilinear roups (in [15]) corresponds to
our construction with A← U2+d,2.
5.2 Group-to-Group Commitments
The commitments of the previous section are “shrinking” because they map a vector of length d in the
group Gr to a vector of length k, for some k independent of and typically smaller than d. Abe et al. [3]
noted that in some applications it is useful to have “group-to-group” commitments, i.e. commitments
which are defined in the same group as the vector message. The motivation for doing so in the bilinear
case is that these commitments are better compatible with Groth-Sahai proofs.
There is a natural generic construction of group-to-group commitments which uses as a black-box any
trapdoor commitment C˜ = (K˜, C˜omm, V˜rfy) mapping vectors of Gr to vectors of Gr+1.
– K(1λ, d,m): Run (c˜k, t˜k)← K˜(1λ,m, d), output ck = c˜k and tk = t˜k.
– Comm(ck, [v]r): To commit to a vector [v]r ∈ Gdr , 0 < r < m, pick [s]r−1 ← [G]kr . Let ([c˜]r, O˜p) ←
C˜omm(ck, [s]r−1) and output
c := ([s+ v]r, [c˜]r)
and the opening Op = (O˜p).
– Vrfy(ck, c, [v]r, Op): On input c = ([y]r, [c˜]r) this algorithm outputs 1 if [s]r := [y − v]r satisfies that
1← V˜rfy(ck, [c˜]r, [s]r, Op), else it outputs 0.
– TrapdoorEquiv(ck, tk, c, [v]r, Op, [v
′]r): On a commitment c = ([y]r, [c˜]r) with opening Op = O˜p, let
[s]r := [y − v]r and [s′]r := [y − v′]r. Run O˜p
′ ← ˜TrapdoorEquiv(ck, tk, [c˜]r, [s]r, O˜p, [s′]r).
Theorem 3. If C˜ is a perfectly hiding, computationally binding commitment to [c]r, then so is C.
Proof. If C˜ is perfectly hiding, then ([s + v]r, C˜omm(c˜k, s)) perfectly hides [v]r because [s]r acts as a
one-time pad. Similarly, it is straightforward to see that if C˜ is computationally binding, so is C˜.
In particular, this generic construction can be instantiated with C˜ as the Pedersen commitment
described in last section to obtain group-to-group commitments of size k + d, and where the opening is
a vector of size k.
Existing constructions. Interestingly, this construction explains the two instantiations of “group-to-group”
commitments given in [3]. Indeed, the generalization of the scheme described above to the asymmetric
bilinear case (under the U1+d,1-KerMDH Assumption) matches the construction in [3], Sect. 4.1. When
A is sampled from the distribution which results from sampling a matrix from the RL2 distribution and
appending d − 1 additional random rows, it matches the construction in [3], Sect. 4.2. For illustration,
we discuss this last example in some more detail.
In [3], Sect. 4.2., (see Fig.2), the commitment to a message (M1, . . . ,Md) ∈ G is a tuple (C1, . . . , Cd+2) ∈
Gd+2 where the elements in each of the groups are written in multiplicative notation,G,H, {Gj , Fj}j=0,...,d
are random elements in G and is defined by the equations:
Ci = MiH
τi Cd+1 = G
τ0
0
d∏
j=1
G
τj
j Cd+2 = F
µ0
0
d∏
j=1
F
τj
j .
Let

G0 1G
1G F0
G1 F1
...
...
Gd Fd
 ∈ G(d+2)×2 and define A as the corresponding matrix of discrete logarithms in base H.
To see that this construction if of the appropriate form, it suffices to note that the pair (Cd+1, Cd+2) is
the Pedersen commitment to (τ1, . . . , τn) with randomness τ0, µ0 and commitment key A.
6 A New Matrix Distribution and Its Applications
Both of our commitment schemes of section 5 base security on some Dk+d,k-KerMDH assumptions, where
d is the length of the committed vector. When d > 1, the only example of Dk+d,k-MDDH Assumption
considered in [12] is the one corresponding to the uniform matrix distribution Uk+d,k, which is the weakest
MDDH Assumption of size (k+ d)× k. Another natural assumption for d > 1 is the one associated to the
matrix distribution resulting from sampling from an arbitrary distribution Dk+1,k (e.g., Lk) defining a
hard Dk+d,k-MDDH problem and adding `−k−1 new random rows. The resulting D`,k-MDDH assumption
is equivalent to the original Dk+1,k-MDDH assumption. However, for efficiency reasons, we would like to
have a matrix distributions with an even smaller representation size. This motivates us to introduce a
new family of matrix distributions, the CIk,d family.
Definition 13 (Circulant Matrix Distribution). We define the distribution CIk,d as follows
A =

a1 0
... a1
ad
...
. . .
1 ad a1
1
. . .
...
. . . ad
0 1

∈ Z(k+d)×kq , where ai ← Zq
Matrix A is such that each column can be obtained by rotating one position the previous column,
which explains the name. Notice that when d = 1, CIk,d is exactly the symmetric cascade distribution
SCk, introduced in [12]. We prove that CIk,d-MDDH Assumption holds generically in k-linear groups,
which implies the hardness of the corresponding KerMDH problem.
On the other hand, Appendix A.1 shows that the representation size of CIk,d, which is the number of
parameters d, is the optimal among all hard matrix distributions Dk,k+d defined by linear polynomials
in the parameters. A similar argument shows that the circulant assumption is also optimal in the sense
that it has a minimal numbers of nonzero entries among all hard matrix distributions Dk,k+d.
The new assumption gives new instantiations of the commitment schemes of Section 5 with public
parameters of size d, independent of k. Further, because the matrix A← CIk,d has a many zero entries,
the number of exponentiations computed by the Commit algorithm, and the number of pairings of the
verification algorithm is kd — as opposed to k(k + d) for the uniform assumption. This seems to be
optimal — but we do not prove this formally.
To prove the generic hardness of the assumption, we turn to a result of Herold [18, Thm. 5.15 and
corollaries]. It states that if all matrices produced by the matrix distribution are full-rank, CIk,d is a hard
matrix distribution. Indeed, an algorithm solving the CIk,d-MDDH problem in the generic k-linear group
model must be able to compute a polynomial in the ideal H ⊂ Zq[a1, . . . , ad, z1, . . . , zk+d] generated by
all the (k + 1)-minors of A‖z as polynomials in a1, . . . , ad, z1, . . . , zk+d. Although this ideal can actually
be generated using only a few of the minors, we need to build a Gro¨bner basis of H to reason about
the minimum degree a nonzero polynomial in H can have. We show that, carefully selecting a monomial
order, the set of all (k + 1)-minors of A‖z form a Gro¨bner basis, and all these minors have total degree
exactly k + 1. Therefore, all nonzero polynomials in H have degree at least k + 1, and then they cannot
be evaluated by any algorithm in the generic k-linear group model.
As for other matrix distribution families, we can apply Corollary 1 and the following lemma to see
that for any fixed d ≥ 1 the hardness of CIk,d-KerMDH is strictly increasing.
Lemma 16. CIk,d-KerMDH⇒ CIk+1,d-KerMDH.
Proof. The proof is very similar to the one of Lemma 15. From a matrix A˜ ← CIk,d, with param-
eters a1, . . . , ad, we also build A ∈ CIk+1,d by adding an extra row and column. Now given x =
(x1, . . . , xk+d+1) ∈ ker A> \ {0}, it is easy to see that the vector x˜ = (x1, . . . , xk+d) is always in
ker A˜> \ {0}.
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A More Details About the Circulant Matrix Distribution
In this appendix we give more details about both the hardness and the optimality of the representation
size of the circulant matrix distribution.
A.1 Optimality of the Representation Size
Lemma 17. A matrix distribution D`,k defined by linear polynomials in the parameters, A(t1, . . . , td) =
A0 + A1t1 + . . . + Adtd, where A1, . . . ,Ad are linearly independent matrices, can only be hard if the
number of parameters d is at least `− k.
Proof. Assume for contradiction that d < ` − k. Then, by gaussian elimination in A we can transform
the matrix into another one, B(t1, . . . , td) = LA(t1, . . . , td) for a constant invertible matrix L, such that
the first column of B has zeroes in the lower ` − d − 1 ≥ k positions (as at most d + 1 entries can
be linearly independent as polynomials in t1, . . . , td). Now, it is straightforward to see that this can be
used to solve the associated D`,k-MDDH problem. Indeed, if L̂ denotes the lowest k rows of L, given
an instance ([A], [z]), we transform it into ([L̂A], [L̂z]) and then compare the ranks of L̂A and L̂A‖L̂z
(computed by means of the k-linear map). The ranks are equal for ‘real’ instances, while they are different
with overwhelming probability for ‘random’ instances of the D`,k-MDDH problem, which contradicts the
hardness of D`,k.
The linear independency requirement in the lemma just means that there is no redundancy among
the d parameters (that is, the map (t1, . . . , td) 7→ A(t1, . . . , td) is injective). The representation of A
must contain at least d group elements, due to the previous injectivity. Therefore, CIk,d has optimal
representation size.
A.2 Hardness
Here we prove that CIk,d is a hard matrix distribution (i.e., the CIk,d-MDDH problem is generically hard
in k-linear groups), using Theorem 5.15 and specially its Corollary 5.16 in [18] in the linear polynomial
case, and Gro¨bner basis computations in some polynomial ideal.
Intuitively, an algorithm solving CIk,d-MDDH problem in the generic k-linear group model must know
some nonzero polynomial in t1, . . . , td, z1, . . . , zk+d vanishing whenever z ∈ Im A(t). But this can only
happen if such polynomial belongs to the ideal H ∈ Zq[t1, . . . , td, z1, . . . , zk+d]10 generated by the relations
between t1, . . . , td, z1, . . . , zk+d obtained by elimination of the variables w1, . . . , wk in the equation z =
A(t)w.
CIk,d has some interesting properties that makes possible the generic hardness proof. Namely, it is
defined by linear polynomials (i.e., A(t) is made of polynomials of degree one in the parameters t1, . . . , td),
and rank A(t) = k for all possible choices of t1, . . . , td ∈ Zq (i.e., in the algebraic closure of Zq). This
second property comes from the fact that the lowest k-minor of A(t) is constant and equal to 1. With
these two properties, Theorem 5.15 and its Corollary 5.16 in [18] essentially state that H is precisely
the ideal generated by all the (k + 1)-minors of A(t)‖z as polynomials in t1, . . . , td, z1, . . . , zk+d. More
precisely,
10
Zq denotes the algebraic closure of the field Zq. We define the ideal in the algebraic closure for technical reasons,
although the polynomial used by the algorithm will necessarily have its coefficients in Zq.
Theorem 4 (from Theorem 5.15 and its Corollary 5.16 in [18]). Let D`,k = {A(t) | t← Zdq} be a
polynomial matrix distribution of degree one such that the matrices A(t) in the distribution have always
full rank, for all choices of the parameters t1, . . . , td in the algebraic closure of Zq. Let
H = I({(t,A(t)w) | t ∈ Zdq , w ∈ Zkq})
that is the ideal of the polynomials in Zq[t, z] vanishing at all (rational) points such that z = A(t)w, for
some w ∈ Zkq , and
D = ({det i1,...,ik+1(A(t)‖z) | 1 ≤ i1 < i2 < · · · < ik+1 ≤ `})
the ideal generated by all (k + 1)-minors of A(t)‖z. Then H = D and it is a prime ideal.
At this point, proving the generic hardness of CIk,d amounts to proving that there is no nonzero
polynomial of total degree less that k + 1 in H. Indeed, this means that the only way to generically
solve the CIk,d-MDDH problem is computing a polynomial of degree strictly greater than k, which is not
feasible in k-linear groups. Notice that in the general case d ≥ 1, finding a lower bound for the total
degree in H is a nontrivial task, while in the case ` = k + 1 or d = 1, as seen in [12], it is as easy as
computing the degree of the determinant polynomial det(A(t)‖z). The main reason for that difficulty is
the fact that the ideal H is not principal. Therefore, we need to compute a Gro¨bner basis of H, and show
that all the polynomials in it have total degree at least k + 1.
Gro¨bner bases can be computed quite easily for specific ideals by means of a computer, but here we
will build bases for an infinite collection of ideals, that is for arbitrary values of the size parameters k
and d. Thus, we have to compute them by hand. Fortunately, we manage to show that the set of all
(k + 1)-minors of A(t)‖z as polynomials in t1, . . . , td, z1, . . . , zk+d, where A← CIk,d, is a Gro¨bner basis
of H.
We recall some basic notions related to ideals and Gro¨bner basis. An admissible monomial order ≺ in
the polynomial ring Zq[t1, . . . , td, z1, . . . , zk+d] is a total order among the monomials in it such that for
any monomials m1,m2,m3
1. m1 6= 1 ⇒ 1 ≺ m1
2. m1 ≺ m2 ⇒ m1m3 ≺ m2m3
The leading monomial of a polynomial p, denoted by LM(p) is defined as the greatest of its monomials
(without the coefficient)11 with respect of the monomial order. We recall that a Gro¨bner basis of H ⊂
Zq[t1, . . . , td, z1, . . . , zk+d] with respect of an admissible monomial order is a set of nonzero polynomials
G = {g1, . . . , gs} ⊂ H with the following properties
1. for every f ∈ H there exist c1, . . . , cs ∈ Zq[t1, . . . , td, z1, . . . , zk+d] such that f = c1g1 + . . .+ csgs,
2. for every f ∈ H, LM(f) is divisible by LM(g) for some g ∈ G.
The following lemma comes in a straightforward way from the previous definition
Lemma 18. The minimal degree of nonzero polynomials in an ideal H is the minimal degree of the
polynomials in any Gro¨bner basis of H with respect to any admissible monomial order compatible with the
total degree.
From now on we fix the following admissible monomial order:
1. degm1 < degm2 ⇒ m1 ≺ m2, where deg denotes the total degree of the monomial,
2. z1 ≺ . . . ≺ zk+d ≺ t1 ≺ . . . ≺ td,
3. if degm1 = degm2,≺ is the lexicographical order. That is, we write m1 = zα11 · · · zαk+dk+d tαk+d+11 · · · tαk+2dd
and m2 = z
β1
1 · · · zβk+dk+d tβk+d+11 · · · tβk+2dd . Then, for the same total degree, m1 ≺ m2 if and only if the
first nonzero difference βi − αi is positive.
11 We call leading term to the leading monomial multiplied by the corresponding coefficient.
Given A ← CIk,d we denote by ∆(i) = ∆(i1, . . . , ik+1) = deti1,...,ik+1(A(t)‖z) the (k + 1)-minor of
A(t)‖z defined by the rows 1 ≤ i1 < i2 < · · · < ik+1 ≤ k + d. From now on we will use i ∈
(
k+d
k+1
)
as a
shorthand for the previous inequalities. These determinants have very special properties. Indeed, we show
that with respect to the previous monomial order the main diagonal defines their leading monomial.
Lemma 19. For all i ∈ (k+dk+1), LM(∆(i)) = zik+1ti1ti2−1 · · · tik−k+1.
Proof. In order to simplify the notation, we can always write the (k + 1)-minors of A(t)‖z as
∆(i) =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
ti1 ti1−1 · · · ti1−k+1 zi1
ti2 ti2−1 · · · ti2−k+1 zi2
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
tik tik−1 · · · tik−k+1 zik
tik+1 tik+1−1 · · · tik+1−k+1 zik+1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
assuming that td+1 = 1, and ti = 0 for any i outside the range i = 1, . . . , d + 1. Then we show that
in the development of the determinant, the monomial corresponding to the main diagonal mdiag =
zik+1ti1ti2−1 · · · tik−k+1 is the leading monomial. Firstly, notice that all the terms occurring in the main
diagonal are proper terms (i.e., neither 0 nor 1). Indeed, 1 ≤ i1 ≤ i2−1 ≤ · · · ≤ ik−k+1 ≤ ik+1−k ≤ d,
which is something that deeply depends on the circulant structure of the matrix A.
Now, assume by contradiction that there is another term in the development of the determinant,
m = ziσ(k+1)tiσ(1)tiσ(2)−1 · · · tiσ(k)−k+1 (written in a possibly unsorted way), for a permutation σ ∈ Sk+1,
such that mdiag ≺ m. Due to the monomial order, the last column must contribute to this term with the
variable zk+1 (that is σ(k + 1) = k + 1). Otherwise, ziσ(k+1) ≺ zik+1 , which contradicts mdiag ≺ m.
We can rewrite m in terms of the inverse permutation pi = σ−1 as
m = zik+1ti1−pi(1)+1ti2−pi(2)+1 · · · tik−pi(k)+1
Then, pi(1) 6= 1 would imply ai1−pi(1)+1 ≺ ai1 , which is also in contradiction with mdiag ≺ m. Therefore,
σ(1) = 1. Observe that it could happen that i1 − pi(1) + 1 ≤ 0, which means that ti1−pi(1)+1 is actually
0, which also contradicts mdiag ≺ m.
Proceeding similarly with subsequent indexes (rows) in increasing order, we easily show that σ can
only be the identity permutation, which concludes the proof.
Now we prove that the set of all (k + 1)-minors of A‖z is a Gro¨bner basis. The proof of this result is
rather technical and deeply relies on the properties of determinants.
Theorem 5. The set G = {∆(i) | i ∈ (k+dk+1)} is a Gro¨bner basis of H with respect to the monomial order≺.
Proof. The usual way to prove that a set G = {g1, . . . , gs} is a Gro¨bner basis is by means of the so-called
S-polynomials. The S-polynomial of a pair gi, gj ∈ G for i 6= j is defined by
si,j = SPOL(gi, gj) =
mi,j
mi
gi − mi,j
mj
gj (2)
where mi = LM(gi), mj = LM(gj), and mi,j denotes the least common multiple of mi and mj . Then, G
is a Gro¨bner basis if and only if for all i 6= j, REDG(si,j) = 0, where REDG(p) denotes the reduction
of a polynomial p by repeatedly taking the remainder of the division by elements in G until no further
division can be properly performed12. Indeed, the famous Buchberger’s algorithm for computing Gro¨bner
12 The reduction algorithm repeatedly takes a polynomial p and checks whether some LM(gi) divides LM(p). If
so, the algorithm cancels out the leading term of p by subtracting from it the appropriate multiple of gi, and
repeats the procedure with the resulting polynomial. Otherwise, the algorithm adds the leading term of p to
the output polynomial and proceeds with the remaining terms of p, until they are exhausted. The output has
the property that none of its monomials is divisible by any LM(gi).
basis iteratively uses the previous computation to either verify that a pair gi, gj ∈ G passes the check, or
to add its reduced S-polynomial to G.
Observe that any expression of the form p = c1g1 + . . . + csgs, where all the leading monomials
nj = LM(cjgj), j = 1, . . . , s, are different, shows that REDG(p) = 0. Indeed, without loss off generality
we can sort the previous terms to ensure that n1 ≺ . . . ≺ ns. Clearly, LM(p) = ns and reducing p by gs
gives the remainder c1g1 + . . .+ cs−1gs−1. Therefore, by induction, we get REDG(p) = 0.
Buchberger also provided two optimization rules to speed up the algorithm. In particular, the second
one (Buchberger’s chain criterion) says that if for some indexes i, j, v, REDG(si,v) = REDG(sj,v) = 0 and
mv divides mi,j , then also REDG(si,j) = 0. We use this criterion to inductively show that in our case, we
only need to deal with pairs of (k + 1)-minors differing only in one row.
We now split the proof into several technical claims. The idea is drawing a path between any two
(k + 1)-minors in which at each step we only change one row of the minor.
The first claim says that from any two (k+ 1)-minors with the same upper α− 1 rows but that differ
in the α-th row, we can build a third “hybrid” minor by moving the α-th row from one determinant
to the other, and the corresponding three leading monomials are related in a suitable way for the chain
criterion described above.
Claim 1. For any two sequences i, i∗ ∈ (k+dk+1) such that the first difference occurs at position α, for
1 ≤ α ≤ k, that is ij = i∗j if j < α and iα < i∗α,
LM(∆(i1, . . . , iα, i
∗
α+1 . . . , i
∗
k+1)) divides lcm(LM(∆(i)),LM(∆(i
∗)))
Proof (of Claim 1). According to Lemma 19,
LM(∆(i1, . . . , iα, i
∗
α+1 . . . , i
∗
k+1)) =
{
zi∗k+1ti1 · · · tiα−α+1ti∗α+1−α · · · ti∗k−k+1 if α < k
zi∗k+1ti1 · · · tik−k+1 if α = k
Then the claim directly comes from the fact that this monomial can be split into two coprime factors
ti1 · · · tiα−α+1 and zi∗k+1ti∗α+1−α · · · ti∗k−k+1, each dividing LM(∆(i)) and LM(∆(i∗)), respectively. Indeed,
both factors are coprime because i1 ≤ · · · ≤ iα − α+ 1 < i∗α − α+ 1 ≤ i∗α+1 − α ≤ · · · ≤ i∗k+1 − k. uunionsq
We call adjacent pair to any pair of minors ∆(i) and ∆(i∗) such that i and i∗ differ only at position α,
for some 1 ≤ α ≤ k + 1, that is ij = i∗j if j 6= α and iα < i∗α. This pair can be actually described by
an increasing sequence of length k + 2, 1 ≤ i1 < · · · < iα < i∗α < · · · < ik+1 ≤ k + d ∈
(
k+d
k+2
)
and the
index α. The previous claim allows us to build a path connecting any two (k+ 1)-minors such that every
consecutive pairs of minors in the path is an adjacent pair. An example for k = 5 is depicted below. The
numbers in every column in the table correspond to the indices of the rows in every minor in the path
connecting ∆(1, 5, 6, 9, 12, 13) and ∆(2, 4, 7, 8, 11, 14).
i1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2
i2 5 4 4 4 4 4 4
i3 6 6 6 6 6 7 7
i4 9 9 8 8 8 8 8
i5 12 12 12 11 11 11 11
i6 13 13 13 13 14 14 14
Using the above path we show that, according to Buchberger’s chain criterion, to prove that G is a
Gro¨bner basis it suffices to check only the S-polynomials of adjacent pairs.
Claim 2. If the S-polynomial of every adjacent pair of (k+ 1)-minors is reducible to 0, then so are all the
other S-polynomials (and therefore G is a Gro¨bner basis of H).
Proof (of Claim 2). We prove the claim by (descending) induction in α, the index of the first row-difference
between two (k + 1)-minors. For α = k + 1 (i.e., the minors only differ in the last row) the statement
is obviously true, as the two minors form an adjacent pair. Now, let us assume that the statement is
true for α = α0, where 1 < α0 ≤ k + 1. Then for any two minors with the first row-difference occurring
at row α0 − 1, say g = ∆(i1, . . . , iα0−2, iα0−1, . . . , ik+1) and g∗ = ∆(i1, . . . , iα0−2, i∗α0−1, . . . , i∗k+1) with
iα0−1 < i
∗
α0−1, we define as in the first claim the “hybrid” minor h = ∆(i1, . . . , iα0−1, i
∗
α0 , . . . , i
∗
k+1).
Then, by Claim 1 we know that LM(h) divides lcm(LM(g),LM(g∗)). On the other hand, the induction
assumption implies REDG(SPOL(h, g)) = 0, since the first row-difference between g and h occurs at row
α0. Moreover, REDG(SPOL(h, g
∗)) = 0 because (h, g∗) is an adjacent pair. Thus, by Buchberger’s chain
criterion, REDG(SPOL(g, g
∗)) = 0, concluding the proof of the second claim. uunionsq
The last step in the proof of the theorem is showing that the S-polynomial of every adjacent pair of
(k+1)-minors is reducible to 0. Actually, the S-polynomial of an adjacent pair of minors can be embedded
into the determinant of a (k + 2)× (k + 2) matrix. This matrix gives us a syzygy (i.e., a linear relation
with polynomial coefficients among elements in G) that allows to manually reduce the S-polynomial to
0.
Claim 3. For any adjacent pair of (k+1)-minors given by the sequence i ∈ (k+dk+2) and the index 1 ≤ α ≤ k+
1, that is g = ∆(i1, . . . , iα, iα+2 . . . , ik+2) and g
∗ = ∆(i1, . . . , iα−1, iα+1 . . . , ik+2), REDG(SPOL(g, g∗)) =
0.
Proof (of Claim 3). Let us consider for the case α ≤ k the extended matrix
B =

ti1 ti1−1 · · · ti1−k+1 zi1 ti1−α+1
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
tiα tiα−1 · · · tiα−k+1 ziα tiα−α+1
tiα+1 tiα+1−1 · · · tiα+1−k+1 ziα+1 tiα−1−α+1
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
tik+2 tik+2−1 · · · tik+2−k+1 zik+2 tik+2−α+1

which is a (k + 2) × (k + 2) matrix13 with two repeated columns: the α-th and the last columns. Thus,
det B = 0, and using Laplace expansion of the determinant along the last column we obtain the following
syzygy:
k+2∑
j=1
j 6=α,α+1
(−1)k+jtij−α+1hj + (−1)k+α
(
tiα−α+1g
∗ − tiα+1−α+1g
)
= 0 (3)
where hj = ∆(i1, . . . , ij−1, ij+1, . . . , ik+2). Actually, g = hα and g∗ = hα+1.
Notice that the S-polynomial s = SPOL(g, g∗), as given by Equation 2, is exactly tiα+1−α+1g −
tiα−α+1g
∗, since
LM(g) = zik+2ti1 · · · tiα−α+1tiα+2−α · · · tik+1−k+1
and
LM(g∗) = zik+2ti1 · · · tiα−1−α+2tiα+1−α+1 · · · tik+1−k+1
As a consequence, Equation 3 gives an explicit reduction of s to 0. Namely,
s =
k+2∑
j=1
j 6=α,α+1
(−1)α+jtij−α+1hj (4)
Actually, to see that Equation 4 implies REDG(s) = 0, we only need to show that all leading monomials
nα,j = LM(tij−α+1hj) = tij−α+1LM(hj), for j = 1, . . . , k + 2, j 6= α, α + 1, corresponding to nonzero
13 Recall that we are using the notational convention introduced in Lemma 19. Thus, some entries in the matrix
can be equal to 0 or 1.
terms14 are different. We now compute all leading monomials nα,j for any j 6= α, α+1 (written as possibly
unsorted products):
nα,j =

zik+2ti1−α+1ti2 · · · tik+1−k+1 for j = 1
zik+2ti1 · · · tij−1−j+2tij−α+1tij+1−j+1 · · · tik+1−k+1 for 1 < j < k + 1
zik+2ti1 · · · tik−k+1tik+1−α+1 for j = k + 1
zik+1ti1 · · · tik−k+1tik+2−α+1 for j = k + 2
Clearly, nα,k+2 is different to the others, and the only coincidence can be nα,j = nα,j∗ for some 1 ≤ j <
j∗ ≤ k + 1. But this would imply (removing all common terms)
tij−α+1tij+1−j+1 · · · tij∗−1−j∗+3ti∗j−j∗+2 = tij−j+1tij+1−j · · · tij∗−1−j∗+2ti∗j−α+1
But due to the inequalities of the indices, the least index in the righthand side, ij − j + 1, can only be
canceled out with the term ij −α+ 1 in the left hand side, thus implying j = α. Similarly, i∗j − j∗+ 2 on
the left must be the same as i∗j − α + 1 on the right, and then j∗ = α + 1. But these values of j, j∗ are
out of the correct range, what shows that no collision among the nα,j is actually possible.
For the remaining case, α = k + 1, we proceed similarly, defining
B =

ti1 ti1−1 · · · ti1−k+1 zi1 zi1
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
tik+1 tik+1−1 · · · tik+1−k+1 zik+1 zik+1
tik+2 tik+2−1 · · · tik+2−k+1 zik+2 zik+2

Now, the syzygy is
k∑
j=1
(−1)k+jzijhj − zik+1g∗ + zik+2g = 0
where hj = ∆(i1, . . . , ij−1, ij+1, . . . , ik+2). Then
s = SPOL(g, g∗) = zik+2g− zik+1g∗ = −
k∑
j=1
(−1)k+jzijhj (5)
and for any j < k + 1
nk+1,j = LM(zijhj) = zijLM(hj) =
{
zi1zik+2ti2ti3−1 · · · tik+1−k+1 for j = 1
zijzik+2ti1 · · · tij−1−j+2tij+1−j+1 · · · tik+1−k+1 for 1 < j < k + 1
which are clearly different. This shows that again Equation 5 is a reduction to 0 of SPOL(g, g∗), which
covers all the remaining adjacent pairs of (k + 1)-minors. uunionsq
Now, the theorem statement is a direct consequence of Claims 2 and 3.
The next corollary finally proves that CIk,d is a hard matrix distribution, that is, the CIk,d-MDDH
problem is generically hard in k-linear groups.
Corollary 2. All nonzero polynomials in H have degree at least k + 1.
Proof. According to Lemma 19 the degree of all polynomials ∆(i) for i ∈ (k+dk+1) is exactly k + 1. Thus,
by Lemma 18 and Theorem 5 the statement follows directly.
14 Some terms in Equation 4 can be zero due to tij−α+1 = 0, what happens exactly when ij − α + 1 ≤ 0 or
ij − α+ 1 ≥ d+ 2
